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1 Introduction
Before one can contemplate the decision to buy a good from a particular firm, one must
be aware that the firm exists. Indeed, one of the more important functions of a firm’s
advertising effort would seem to be to inform potential customers of its existence. If
it is costly for firms to advertise or costly for potential customers to search for firms it
seems unlikely that all potential customers will be aware of all firms. The ensuing partial
overlap of customer bases across firms gives rise to the presence of captive consumers and
these, in turn, give rise to market power. We examine two related problems facing firms
when they are able to influence the degree of overlap of their customer bases through
their advertising efforts. First we determine how the degree of overlap in customer
bases between firms affects the price equilibrium in a duopoly setting and, taking this
price equilibrium into account, second we determine how firms choose the size of their
customer bases.
In Section 2, we describe the price equilibrium in a simple duopoly model with
identical goods and common constant marginal costs of production. Each consumer
buys a quantity of the good from the lowest-priced firm that she knows of and all
consumers have the same demand function. It is well known that when some potential
customers are aware of both firms and some are aware of just one firm, no pure strategy
price equilibrium exists. The mixed strategy equilibrium involves the firms randomizing
over a set of prices where the upper bound is the monopoly price and the lower bound
is a function of the monopoly price and the extent of the overlap between the two firms’
customer bases. The equilibrium is therefore characterized by price dispersion. We
find that the expected equilibrium price is decreasing in the degree of overlap between
customer bases and increasing in the degree of asymmetry between the sizes of the two
firms’ customer bases.
In Section 3 we go on to examine a two-stage game in which firms engage in costly
advertising to make potential customers aware of their existence in stage 1 and choose
prices in stage 2. The stage 2 price game is, of course, the game we analyze in Section
2. In the stage 1 game, firms’ advertising efforts determine the size of their respective
customer bases and, implicitly, the overlap between these customer bases. For a specific
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advertising technology that generates customer bases by random sampling with replace-
ment from the entire customer population, the stage 1 equilibrium is asymmetric and
one firm will have a customer base that is twice as large as the other. This leads to
a mixed strategy equilibrium of the stage 2 game in which prices are, relative to the
standard Bertrand model, very high. While both firms randomize between the same set
of prices, the larger firm has a higher expected price than the smaller firm. Perhaps
surprisingly, we show in the appendix that the subgame perfect equilibrium is efficient
if consumer demand is perfectly inelastic up to the reservation price.
In Section 4, we derive the general result that the subgame perfect equilibrium is
always asymmetric with respect to the size of customer bases if the advertising tech-
nology places positive probability on a consumer being contacted by both firms. Given
that there will always be a large firm, this in turn implies that in the equilibrium the
overlap of customer bases will be imperfect and the larger firm at least will have captive
consumers.
In our model, firms make irreversible advertising decisions in stage 1 that influence
the nature of price competition in stage 2. We find that the smaller firm has a strong
incentive to, in effect, hide from some of the potential customers in order to limit the
price competition in the stage 2 game. Others have demonstrated a similar incentive
to take action in stage 1 to lessen price competition in stage 2. For example, in Kreps
and Scheinkman (1983) firms choose capacities in stage 1 in order to credibly commit to
smaller output and therefore above marginal cost prices in stage 2. In Gabszewicz and
Thisse (1979, 1980, 1986) firms choose qualities before entering into price competition,
which gives rise to maximum differentiation in qualities in stage 1 and above marginal
cost prices in stage 2.
When firms sell a homogeneous product and there is less than perfect overlap be-
tween the firms’ customer bases, only a mixed strategy price equilibrium exists and
therefore the equilibrium is characterized by price dispersion. Several authors have doc-
umented the presence and persistence of price dispersion in retail markets. These papers
range from early descriptive studies (see for example Stigler (1961) and Pratt, Wise and
Zeckhauser (1979)) to more sophisticated studies that attempt to isolate the dispersion
that is due to imperfect information as opposed to differences in production costs and
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quality differences (see for example Sorensen (2000), Lach (2002) and Baye, Morgan and
Scholten (2004)). For example, Sorensen investigates the market for prescription drugs
in two New York cities in 1998 and finds that, after controlling for pharmacy hetero-
geneity, on the average the highest posted price for a particular drug is 50 % higher than
the lowest posted price.
In a pioneering paper that has not received the attention that it deserves, Ireland
(1993) finds that when two firm who sell identical goods can costlessly advertise to a
population of previously uninformed consumers, one firm will advertise to all consumers
and the other firm will advertise to half of the consumers. This results in half of all
consumers being captive to the large firm and a mixed strategy price equilibrium where
firms put positive probability on all prices between [R2 , R], where R is the reservation
price common to all consumers. Ireland extends the duopoly model to a n-firm oligopoly
and finds that in equilibrium there will be one large firm and (n−1) equally sized smaller
firms. The large firm will advertise to all consumers and the small firms will advertise
to only part of the population. All firms’ expected prices are strictly decreasing in n.
Our model differs from that of Ireland in a number of key ways. First, because we
treat the size and overlap of customer bases as exogenous and independent in the stage
2 pricing analysis, we are able to gain more general insights about the price equilibrium
that are applicable to any type of advertising technology. At one extreme we find that
when advertising leads to zero overlap between customer bases, such as when firms are
able to target different customer groups, the firms set monopoly prices. At the other
extreme when the two firm’s customer bases are identical in both size and composition,
as they might be if both firms purchase the same contact list from a marketer, the
pricing equilibrium corresponds to the standard Bertrand marginal-cost pricing result.
More generally, as the overlap of the two firm’s customer bases increases from zero to
the smaller firm’s customer base, prices and profits decrease linearly for both firms, but
remain above zero as long as the firms’ customer bases are different in size. Notice that
our price equilibrium applies whether or not stage 1 is in equilibrium. As any advertising
efforts to make yourself known cannot be easily reversed in the short run, it is plausible
that the stage 1 outcome will not be an equilibrium when the firms play their pricing
game, and our set-up can accommodate for this.
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Second, while our stage 1 advertising analysis encompasses Ireland’s setup, we are
able to provide general insights into firms’ advertising behavior. We get a strong result
that the asymmetry of the advertising equilibrium prevails whenever the advertising
technology places positive probability on the likelihood that a single consumer will be
targeted by both firms. In the context of a specific advertising technology that is costly
and random we examine how changes in the cost of advertising impacts on the size
of customer bases and how, in turn, this affects the degree of market power enjoyed
by each firm. We find that the size of a firm’s customer base is inversely related to
the ratio of the marginal cost of adding new customers into the customer base and
the per customer monopoly revenue but, as long as the firms’ advertising technologies
use random sampling from a common population, the larger firm’s customer base is
always twice that of the smaller firm. Moreover, the lower bound of the equilibrium
price distribution and the magnitude of the expected prices are positively related to this
ratio. The larger firm always has a higher expected price and makes larger equilibrium
profits than the smaller firm. Finally, we discuss the incentives of consumers to engage
in search to break down the market power of firms and the incentives of the smaller firm
to frustrate this search.
A seminal paper in advertising by Butters (1977) examines a situation where con-
sumers become aware of the existence of the firms only through random advertising. If
informed, consumers purchase at most one unit of the good from the firm advertising
the lowest price. Butters looks at the cumulative distribution of advertised prices and
sale prices in the market, the latter taking into account that each consumer chooses the
lowest price advertised to her. Therefore, his focus is on the market and not on the
behavior of each individual firm. Another main difference between our results and But-
ter’s is that our equilibrium is asymmetric whereas his equilibrium is symmetric. This
makes his equilibrium price support, when applied to two firms, quite different from
ours. However, our comparative static results are similar in that we both find that the
expected transaction price is decreasing in the cost of advertising and that, in the limit,
all consumers buy the good as the marginal cost of informing an additional consumer
approaches zero.
McAfee (1994) generalizes Butters by separating the firms’ choices of product avail-
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ability and pricing into a two-stage process. McAfee’s product availability can intuitively
be thought of as shelf space in stores that are located in malls. Consumers visit all stores
in one mall only and thus have some probability of finding out about a firm’s product.
McAfee shows that equilibrium availability rates are asymmetric across firms such that
there is one large firm and (n− 1) equally sized small firms and derives the equilibrium
mixed strategies for prices. In this way McAfee’s model is closer to us and Ireland than
Butter’s. We differ from McAfee in that we focus on how the choice of advertising tech-
nology affects the price equilibrium whereas McAfee focuses on cartel formation and
mergers.
Butters also examines optimal non-sequential consumer search in conjunction with
advertising, and Robert and Stahl (1993) extend the analysis to include optimal sequen-
tial search. Bester and Petrakis (1995) examine a model where consumers are spatially
dispersed and know of their local store, but may also be informed of the price of the
other firm through advertising. The equilibrium may involve random advertising where
firms advertise and offer low prices at positive probability and do not advertise and have
high prices at remaining probability. In the equilibrium, consumers are always aware of
both firms’ prices either because they receive an advertisement or because they do not
receive one and deduce that the firm is charging a high price. As a result, our set-up
with partial overlap of consumer bases cannot be derived from the Bester and Petrakis
model. Schmalensee (1983) uses the Butters advertising technology to examine whether
an incumbent monopoly can deter entry through extensive advertising. If a potential
entrant enters, the firms engage in Cournot competition, and therefore by definition
Schmalensee does not examine price dispersion.
Varian (1980) examines temporal equilibrium price dispersion in a monopolistically
competitive model with informed and uninformed consumers. He finds that firms ran-
domize their prices over time, which results in price dispersion across the set of firms
at any given time. Varian finds that all firms use the same pricing strategy in the
equilibrium and enjoy zero profits due to free entry. Our paper differs from Varian in
that we examine a duopoly game where firms can maintain market power despite sell-
ing identical goods and where the firms always use asymmetric pricing strategies in the
equilibrium. Baye and Morgan (2001) analyze firm advertising through a clearinghouse
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where consumers can observe the prices of many competitors by accessing one website.
Both the firms and the consumers pay a fixed subscription fee only and therefore have
a zero marginal cost of search. Price dispersion results because the clearinghouse owner
maximizes profit by pricing access so as to achieve only partial participation of sellers.
We differ from Baye and Morgan in that our firms must contact consumers directly, not
through a clearinghouse.
In the search literature, there is usually a large number of firms setting prices and
consumers have rational expectations on the price distribution but not the location
of firms in the distribution. Consumers engage in either non-sequential search (Stigler,
1961, Burdett and Judd, 1983) or sequential search (McCall, 1965, Nelson 1970, Burdett
and Judd, 1983) to locate a low price. The search costs of consumers determine the
intensity of the search as well as the price equilibrium. Diamond (1970) shows that if
consumers face the same non-zero cost for all searches beyond the first search, the only
equilibrium in the market is one where all firms charge the monopoly price and where
consumers do not search. Salop and Stiglitz (1977) show that when consumers differ in
their cost of search and when a search makes consumers fully informed, it is possible to
have an equilibrium where the high-cost consumers do not search and there are some
firms who have above marginal cost prices and serve the uninformed consumers only.
Stiglitz (1989) reviews and analyzes other search technologies that result in equilibrium
price dispersion. It is also possible to have equilibrium price dispersion if consumers
and firms optimally choose to remain somewhat ignorant of their economic environment
(Rothschild and Yaari, in Rothschild 1973). Burdett and Judd (1983) show that we
can get equilibrium price dispersion in a rational expectations model even without ex
ante consumer heterogeneity if the model exhibits ex post heterogeneity in consumer
information due to stochasticity in the acquisition of information. The commonality of
all these papers is the assumption of rational expectations and therefore that consumers
know the true distribution of prices in the market. This set-up takes as given that
consumers are aware of the existence of all firms and all prices charged by the firms,
but not which firm charges what. This is in contrast to our model where we assume
that some consumers are only aware of the existence and price of one of the firms while
others know the existence and price of both firms.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we analyze the duopoly
pricing game that arises when customer bases are fixed and there is limited overlap
between them. The price game analyzed in Section 2 then becomes, in Section 3, the
second stage of a two stage game in which customer bases are chosen through existence
advertising in stage 1 using a specific advertising technology. In Section 4 we generalize
the advertising technology to demonstrate that the asymmetry result obtained in Section
3 holds for a wide range of advertising technologies. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Pricing Problem
It is well understood in the literature that if a firm has captive consumers, a pricing game
does not have a pure strategy equilibrium but that a mixed strategy equilibrium exists.
The mixed strategy equilibrium consists of continuous probability density functions
over a set of prices. Several authors have derived equilibrium price density functions
for different models (see for example Narasimhan (1988), Ireland (1993) and McAfee
(1994)). Some common findings include that i) the upper bound of the equilibrium
price support is the monopoly price; ii) the lower bound is equal to the product of the
monopoly price and the proportion of captive or loyal customers amongst those who
know of the larger firm and is the price at which the larger firm is indifferent between
selling to its captive consumers at the monopoly price and selling to all the consumers
who know of it at the lower bound; iii) all firms randomize over a common set of prices
with the exception of the top of the distribution where the larger firm, if one exists, has
a mass point and the smaller firm has zero density; and iv) no other mass points exist.
Since the specific functional form of the equilibrium density functions is determined
by the assumptions made and the notation used in a model, we present the specific
mixed strategies used by the two firms in our model as functions of the proportion of
the firms’ customers that are captive to each firm. The proportion of customers that
are captive depends on how much overlap is created by an advertising technology to
build the firms’ customer bases. Our notation makes it straightforward to derive some
interesting results on the effect of the advertising technology on the price equilibrium.
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2.1 Notation
There are two firms competing to sell a homogeneous good and many potential cus-
tomers. Each of these potential customers demands a quantity Q(p) from the firm
offering the lowest price amongst the firms whose existence they know of. We assume
that the associated per customer revenue function,
R(p) ≡ pQ(p),
is continuous and single peaked.4 Then, letting p¯ denote the price at which R(p) attains
its maximum value, we see that R(p) is an increasing function of p on the interval [0, p¯].
It is convenient to think in terms of a larger and a smaller firm, so we index firms
by L and S. The number of customers who know of firms L and S are NL and NS ,
respectively, and the number of customers who know of both firms is M . We assume
that NL ≥ NS ≥ M > 0. The number of customers who know of firm S but not
firm L is NS −M and the number of customers who know of firm L but not firm S is
NL−M . TheM customers that know of both firms are, of course, up for grabs, but the
willingness of firms to cut price to grab them is conditioned by the fact that they have
captive customers who are unaware of the other firm.
Customers who know of just one firm patronize that firm. Customers who know of
both firms patronize the firm with the lower price if prices differ, and if prices are identi-
cal they randomly choose one firm or the other, with equal probability. For convenience
we assume that the marginal costs of both firms are 0. Firms maximize expected profit,
which is equal to aggregate expected revenue since marginal costs are 0.
Some additional notation is useful. The proportions of the larger and smaller firm’s
customers who are captive are
λL ≡
NL −M
NL
and λS ≡
NS −M
NS
.
Define the maximized per customer monopoly revenue as
R¯ ≡ R(p¯).
4In fact neither continuity nor single peakedness are necessary for the main results we establish in
this section, but for expositional purposes they are convenient.
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Define price p as the price that makes the larger firm indifferent between selling to all
the consumers who know of it at price p and selling only to its captive consumers at
price p¯:
R(p) ≡ R¯λL.
2.2 The Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
There is a mixed strategy equilibrium5 where both firms put positive probability on all
prices in [p, p¯] if the firms are the same size. If one firm is larger than the other, it
randomizes in the closed interval [p, p¯] with a mass point at p = p¯, and the smaller firm
randomizes in the open interval [p, p¯). The equilibrium density function for the smaller
firm is
fS(p) =

0 if p < p
λL
1−λL
(
R¯R′(p)
R(p)2
)
if p ≤ p < p¯
0 if p = p¯.
(1)
Integrating (1) yields the associated CDF:
FS(p) =

0 if p < p
1
1−λL
(
1− λLR¯
R(p)
)
if p ≤ p < p¯
1 if p = p¯.
The equilibrium DF for the larger firm is
fL(p) =
 0 if p < pλL
1−λS
(
R¯R′(p)
R(p)2
)
if p ≤ p < p¯
(2)
mL(p¯) = 1−
NS
NL
. (3)
Notice that when NS < NL, there is a mass point at p¯ in the larger firm’s DF in (3) –
the probability that pL = p¯ is mL(p¯) = 1−
NS
NL
. The remainder of the probability mass
is distributed over the half open interval, [p, p¯). Integrating (2) yields the associated
CDF:
FL(p) =

0 if p < p
1
1−λS
(
1− λLR¯
R(p)
)
if p ≤ p < p¯
1 if p = p¯.
5A detailed proof is provided in Appendix A.
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The equilibrium expected profits are
Π∗L = λLNLR¯ (4)
for the larger firm and
Π∗S = λLNSR¯ (5)
for the smaller firm.
2.3 Comments on the Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
Since firms compete over the M customers who know of both firms, comparative statics
with respect toM are of considerable interest. Naturally, asM increases, expected prices
and profits decrease. In fact, expected profits decrease linearly at the rate R¯ for the
larger firm and at the rate R¯NL
NS
for the smaller firm. In the limit asM approaches 0, we
have two monopolists with prices equal to p¯ enjoying full monopoly profits, pi∗L = R¯NL
and pi∗S = R¯NS . WhenM approaches its upper bound, NS , equilibrium profits approach
pi∗L = (1−
NS
NL
)R¯NL and pi
∗
S = (1−
NS
NL
)R¯NS .
If the firms are of equal size, that is if NL = NS = N , equilibrium profits and
prices go to zero as M approaches its upper bound, N . So in the symmetric case, as
M transits the [0,N ] interval there is a smooth transition from the monopoly outcome
where expected prices are p¯ to the Bertrand outcome where expected prices are 0. This
is a satisfying property of the model.
If the firms are of unequal size, however, as M approaches its upper limit NS equi-
librium profits persist and the model does not converge to the Bertrand outcome. For
example, if the smaller firm’s customer base is half that of the larger firm, equilibrium
profits of the two firms converge to one half their monopoly levels as M approaches
its upper bound. In fact, 1 − NS
NL
can be regarded as the upper bound on the degree
of competitiveness of this model, because the profits of the firms can be no less than
(1− NS
NL
)% of full monopoly profits. This is an interesting property of the model.
Of course, in the larger picture both the sizes of the customer bases (NL and NS)
and the degree of overlap (M) are endogenous and therefore ought to be modeled. We
turn to this problem in the next section. It is clear, however, that foresighted firms
will understand that both overlap and the degree of asymmetry in customer bases have
12
significant impacts on equilibrium prices and will take this into account when choosing
customer bases.
For future purposes, let us record some precise results with respect to equilibrium
prices.
Result 1. The smaller firm’s expected price, E(pS), is
E(pS) = −p¯
λL
1− λL
ln(λL).
The larger firm’s expected price, E(pL), is
E(pL) =
p¯
1− λS
(λL − λS − λLln(λL)) .
The expected minimum price, E (min(pL, pS)), paid by consumers who know of both firms
is
E (min(pL, pS)) =∫ p¯
pS=p
∫ p¯
pL=p
(pLfL(pL) (1− FS(pL)) + pSfS(pS)(1− FL(pS))) dpLdpS
= p¯
λL
1− λS
(
2 +
λL + λS
1− λL
ln(λL)
)
.
The expected transaction price, ETP , is
ETP =
NL −M
NL +NS −M
E(pL) +
NS −M
NL +NS −M
E(pS) +
M
NL +NS −M
E (min(pL, pS))
= p¯
λL(2− λL − λS)
1− λLλS
.
3 Choosing Customer Bases with a Random Advertising
Technology
In this section we extend the game to analyze the firms’ choices with respect to the
size of their customer bases and, implicitly, the degree of overlap. We have in mind an
advertising technology that allows firms to manage their customer bases by varying their
expenditure on advertising. We imagine a population of potential customers of size H.
We assume that initially all the potential customers are ignorant of the firms and that
they become aware of them only through the advertising efforts of the firms. We look
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at a two stage game: in stage 1 firms choose their customer bases and in stage 2 they
choose prices. The mixed strategy equilibrium presented in the previous section is the
equilibrium of the stage 2 price game. We analyze a more general form of advertising
technology in Section 4.
3.1 The Advertising Technology
We denote the cost of making one’s firm known to N ≤ H of the potential customers by
the function A(N). It is natural to suppose that A is increasing and convex in N and
that marginal cost, A′(N), is a decreasing function of population size, H. Given NL and
NS , what should we assume about M , the overlap in the two customer bases? If both
NL and NS are small relative to H it seems likely that there will be very little overlap,
whereas if both are large relative to H there will inevitably be substantial overlap. It
also seems sensible to suppose that the overlap is an increasing function of both NL and
NS . The technology we lay out below exhibits these properties.
For concreteness, we assume that customer bases are generated by random drawings
with replacement from the population of size H, and that each draw costs v. We assume
that v ∈ (0, R¯). If v ≥ R¯, then the cost of getting a customer would necessarily be greater
than or equal to the maximum revenue the firm could generate from the customer.
Suppose a firm’s customer base is initially N . Then, since new customers are gener-
ated by drawing with replacement from the population of size H, the probability that
an additional draw from the distribution yields a customer that in not already in the
firm’s customer base is H−N
H
, so the expected number of additional draws needed to get
a new customer is H
H−N
. Since each draw costs v, the marginal cost of an additional
customer is vH
H−N
. That is,
A′(N) =
vH
H −N
.
Then, integrating the marginal cost function yields the cost function
A(N) = vH[ln(H)− ln(H −N)].
Notice that A(N) is increasing and strictly convex in N , and that A′(N) is a decreasing
function of the population size, H.
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Given that customer bases are generated by random sampling with replacement, any
particular person in the population is just as likely to be included in a firm’s customer
base as is any other person. So, the probability that any person in firm i’s customer base
is also included in firm j’s customer base is Nj
H
and the expected overlap in customer
bases is
M =
NLNS
H
.
If both NL and NS are small relative to H, there will be very little overlap, if both are
large relative to H there will be substantial overlap, and the overlap is an increasing
function of both NL and NS .
3.2 Stage 1 Objective Functions
In our two-stage game, firms simultaneously choose customer bases in stage 1, and price
distributions in stage 2. A firm’s stage 1 objective function is then the expected profit
that it will earn in the stage 2 price game minus the costs of creating the customer base
in stage 1.
Clearly, in the stage 2 mixed strategy equilibrium, a firm’s expected profit is a
function of the stage 1 choices of customer bases. Given our advertising technology,
M = NLNS
H
, so λL = 1 −
NS
H
. Of course, λL is the proportion of people in the larger
firm’s customer base who are captive – that is, who know nothing of the smaller firm.
Notice that λL is completely determined by NS and H. From (4) and (5), the expected
profits of the two firms in the stage 2 price game are then
pi∗S = λLR¯NS
= R¯NS
(
1−
NS
H
)
and
pi∗L = λLR¯NL
= R¯NL
(
1−
NS
H
)
.
For the larger firm, the marginal value of an additional person in its customer base,
R¯
(
1− NS
H
)
, is independent of its choice variable, NL, whereas for the smaller firm, the
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marginal value of an additional person in its customer base, R¯
(
1− 2NS
H
)
, is a decreasing
function of its choice variable, NS.
Using these results, and returning to the notation where firms are denoted by i and j
allowing either firm to be the larger or the smaller firm, we see that the stage 1 objective
function of firm i, Vi(Ni,Nj), is the following:
Vi(Ni,Nj) =
 R¯Ni
(
1− Ni
H
)
−A(Ni) if Ni ≤ Nj
R¯Ni
(
1− Nj
H
)
−A(Ni) if Ni ≥ Nj.
3.3 Concavity of the Stage 1 Objectives Functions
In choosing its customer base, firm i must contemplate two regimes, the LT regime
where Ni ≤ Nj , and the GT regime where Ni ≥ Nj . In the LT regime,
∂Vi(Ni,Nj)
∂Ni
= R¯
(
1−
2Ni
H
)
−
vH
H −Ni
if Ni ≤ Nj
∂2Vi(Ni,Nj)
∂N2i
= −
2R¯
H
−
vH
(H −Ni)2
< 0
and in the GT regime,
∂Vi(Ni,Nj)
∂Ni
= R¯
(
1−
Nj
H
)
−
vH
H −Ni
if Ni ≥ Nj
∂2Vi(Ni,Nj)
∂N2i
= −
vH
(H −Ni)2
< 0.
So, within each of these regimes, firm i’s objective function is strictly concave in Ni.
However, across the two regimes, firm i’s objective function is not concave. This
can be seen by comparing ∂Vi(Ni,Nj)
∂Ni
for the two regimes, at the point where Ni = Nj .
At this point, the marginal value of Ni in the GT regime is greater than its marginal
value in the LT regime:
R¯
(
1−
Nj
H
)
−
vH
H −Nj
> R¯
(
1−
2Nj
H
)
−
vH
H −Nj
.
This, of course, means that over the two regimes, firm i’s objective function is not
concave. The objective function is illustrated in Figure 1 for four different values of Nj .
Firm i’s objective function is continuous in Ni, but it is kinked at Ni = Nj; in some
neighborhood centered on the kink ∂Vi(Ni,Nj)
∂Ni
is greater in the GT regime that it is in
the LT regime.
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Ni
Vi(Ni, N¯j)
N¯j
∆1 N∗i = φ(N¯j)
V ∗i = V
GT
i
∆2
a: N¯j < ∆1
Ni
V1(Ni, N¯j)
N¯j
∆1
V LTi
∆2
N∗i = φ(N¯j)
V ∗i = V
GT
i
b: ∆1 < N¯j < N˜ < φ(N¯j)
Ni
Vi(Ni, N¯j)
N¯j
N∗i = ∆1
V ∗i = V
LT
i
∆2
φ(N¯j)
V GTi
c: ∆1 < N˜ < N¯j < φ(N¯j)
Ni
Vi(Ni, N¯j)
N¯jN
∗
i = ∆1
V ∗i = V
LT
i
φ(N¯j)
∆2
d: φ(N¯j) < N¯j
Figure 1: Stage 1 objective function for firm i for four different values of N¯j : The
objective function is given by the solid line.
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It also means that there is no symmetric equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary that
there was a symmetric equilibrium, N∗i = N
∗
j = N
∗. For this to be an equilibrium,
it must the case that N∗ is a best response to N∗. Supposing that N∗j = N
∗, this
requires that R¯
(
1− N
∗
H
)
≤ vH
H−N∗
, otherwise firm i’s best response in GT regime would
be some Ni > N
∗, and it also requires that R¯
(
1− 2N
∗
H
)
≥ vH
H−N∗
, otherwise firm i’s best
response in LT regime would be some Ni < N
∗. Obviously, it is impossible to satisfy
both inequalities. So we have a result.
Result 2. The customer base game does not have a symmetric equilibrium.
3.4 The Best Response Functions and Equilibria of the Customer Base
Game
For clarity, we focus on firm i’s best response function, BRi(Nj) as the best response
function of the other firm is symmetric. As the nature of the best response functions
is intuitive from Figure 1 but rather cumbersome to derive, we will present the best
response functions in this section but leave their derivation to Appendix B.
Result 3. The best response function of each firm is given by
BRi(Nj) = Φ(Nj) if Nj ≤ N˜
BRi(Nj) = ∆1 if Nj ≥ N˜ ,
where Φ(Nj) satisfies
∂Vi(Ni=Φ(Nj),Nj)
∂Ni
= 0:
Φ(Nj) ≡ H
(
1−
v
R¯
H
H −Nj
)
, (6)
∆1 is the largest value of Nj such that
∂Vi(Ni=Nj ,Nj)
∂Ni
≥ 0:
∆1 ≡ H
(
3
4
−
1
4
√
1 + 8
v
R¯
)
. (7)
and Nj = N˜ is the value of Nj such that V
GT
i (N˜) ≡ V
LT
i and is implicitly defined by:
Φ(N˜)R¯
(
1−
N˜
H
)
− vH[ln(H)− ln(H − Φ(N˜))] = (8)
∆1R¯
(
1−
∆1
H
)
− vH[ln(H)− ln(H −∆1)]. (9)
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Intuitively, when Nj is small (below N˜), firm i wants to be large and it maximizes
profit by choosing N∗i = φ(Nj) that maximizes its profit in the GT regime. This is
illustrated in cases a and b in Figure 1. Similarly, when Nj is large (above N˜), firm
i wants to be small and it maximizes profit by choosing N∗i = ∆1, a constant, that
maximizes its profit in the LT regime. This is illustrated in cases c and d in Figure 1.
N˜ is the value of Nj that makes V
LT
i ≡ V
GT
i and thus causes the firm to switch from
wanting to be larger than its competitor to wanting to be smaller than its competitor.
We have plotted the best response functions in Figure 2. Notice that there are two
equilibria. In each equilibrium the smaller customer base is ∆1 in (7) and the larger
customer base is Φ(∆1) in (6), which is equal to 2∆1. So, in equilibrium the larger
customer base is twice the smaller customer base.6 It is worth noting that one of the
equilibria is also the Stackelberg equilibrium in a game where the firms choose their
customer bases sequentially in stage 1 and choose prices simultaneously in stage 2. The
leader chooses to be the larger firm with customer base 2∆1 and the follower chooses to
be the smaller firm with customer base ∆1.
Result 4. In the subgame perfect equilibrium of this model, the customer base of the
smaller firm, N∗S, is
N∗S = ∆1 = H
(
3
4
−
1
4
√
1 + 8
v
R¯
)
= HΩ,
and the customer base of the larger firm, 2∆1, is
N∗L = 2∆1 = 2HΩ,
where
Ω ≡
3
4
−
1
4
√
1 + 8
v
R¯
.
The composite parameter Ω is the equilibrium proportion of the total population
that is in the smaller firm’s customer base. It is inversely related to the ratio v
R¯
, and
given that 0 < v
R¯
< 1, 0 < Ω < 12 . Of course, 2Ω is the equilibrium proportion of
the total population that is in the larger firm’s customer base. As the cost of sending
a message to a customer, v, approaches R¯, the ratio v
R¯
approaches 1, Ω approaches 0,
6When advertising is costless, the larger firm targets the entire population and the smaller firm
targets half of the population. This result was shown by Ireland (1993).
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Ni
Nj
BRi(Nj)
BRi(Nj)
BRj(Ni)
BRj(Ni)
45o
b
b
a
b
∆1
φ(∆1) = 2∆1
φ(∆1) = 2∆1
∆1
N˜
N˜
Figure 2: Best response functions and two Nash equilibria in customer bases
and both customer bases go to 0. As v
R¯
approaches 0, Ω approaches 12 , and in this
limit the smaller firm targets half the population and the larger firm targets the entire
population.7
3.5 Prices
Now let us explore the price equilibrium that emerges when firms choose their customer
bases. For this purpose it is useful to choose a unit for the good such that the quantity
demanded when price is p¯ is 1. Then, p¯ = R¯ and we can normalize prices by dividing
them by R¯.
Result 5. In the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, the normalized expected
prices of the smaller and larger firms are
E
(
p∗S
R¯
)
=
1− Ω
Ω
ln
(
1
1− Ω
)
and
E
(
p∗L
R¯
)
=
1
2Ω
(
Ω+ (1− Ω)ln
(
1
1− Ω
))
7In Appendix C we show that in the special case where customer demand is completely price inelastic,
the equilibrium is efficient in the sense that total surplus is maximized.
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the normalized expected minimum price is
E
(
min
(
p∗L
R¯
,
p∗S
R¯
))
=
1− Ω
2Ω
(
2−
2− 3Ω
Ω
ln
(
1
1− Ω
))
the normalized expected transaction price is
ETP ∗
R¯
=
3(1 − Ω)
(3− 2Ω)
;
the lower bound on normalized prices is
λ∗L = 1−
N∗S
H
= 1− Ω.
The lower bound on normalized prices conveys the flavor of these results well and
simply. Prices are never less than 1−Ω. Given that 0 < Ω < 12 , we see that
1
2 < λ
∗
L < 1
and in equilibrium normalized prices are never less than 12 . As
v
R¯
approaches 0, both Ω
and the lower bound on the price support approach 12 . This seems to be an interesting
result because in this limit both advertising and production are costless but yet the
normalized equilibrium prices are never less than 12 . The contrast with the standard
Bertrand model, where normalized price is 0 in equilibrium, is sharp.
In the Proposition, normalized prices are expressed as functions of the composite
parameter Ω, but Ω is itself completely determined by the ratio v
R¯
. Naturally, all of
the normalized prices reported in the proposition are increasing functions of v
R¯
. Table
1 conveys the nature of the dependence of various measures of normalized price on v
R¯
.
3.6 Search
Our model is motivated by the observation that in some circumstances not all customers
know of the existence of all firms. Surely, this is not an uncommon occurrence and we
have modeled the pricing problem that it raises. In the equilibrium of our model, some
consumers have something to gain by learning about the existence of firms and so in this
sense have an incentive to search. If they act on those incentives then the equilibrium
will be upset. It is not at all clear, however, how to model search in this framework. How
does a person go about finding a firm the very existence of which the person is not aware?
How does one calculate the possible gains from finding such a firm? Further, from our
analysis it is quite clear that beyond some point the smaller firm has an incentive to
frustrate the attempts by customers to search it out because successful search generates
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Table 1: Normalized equilibrium prices, proportion of captive consumers and benefit
from search as a percentage of R¯ for different values of v
R¯
v
R¯
E
(
p∗
S
R¯
)
E
(
p∗
L
R¯
)
ETP ∗
R¯
E
(
min(
p∗
L
R¯
,
p∗
S
R¯
)
)
λ∗L benefit of search
.001 .69 .85 .75 .65 .50 .25
.10 .76 .88 .81 .72 .59 .19
.20 .80 .90 .85 .77 .65 .15
.30 .84 .92 .88 .82 .71 .12
.40 .87 .94 .91 .85 .76 .09
.50 .90 .95 .93 .88 .81 .07
.60 .92 .96 .95 .91 .85 .05
.70 .94 .97 .96 .94 .89 .04
.80 .96 .98 .98 .96 .93 .02
.90 .98 .99 .99 .98 .97 .01
.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .00
overlap, and overlap leads to the dissipation of profit through price competition. A
more complete model would perhaps include both consumer search and its frustration
by smaller firms.
Although we are not in a position to formally model customer search, we can say a
little bit about the incentives. For this purpose it is useful to consider the special case
in which customer demand is perfectly price inelastic. In this special case, a customer
demands 1 unit of the good for normalized prices in the interval [0, 1] and 0 units for
higher prices. In the equilibrium there are four categories of customers: those who know
of the smaller firm but not the larger firm; those who know of the larger firm but not
the smaller firm; those of who know of neither firm; and those of know of both firms.
Customers in all but the last category have something to gain by search. Those who
know of neither firm have the most to gain – a successful search that allowed them to
identify one firm would yield a surplus equal to R¯(1 − ETP
∗
R¯
) – from Table 1, we see
that this can be as large as .25R¯, but is a modest .07R¯ when v
R¯
= .5. Those who know
of the larger firm but not the smaller one, have the second highest incentive to search –
a successful search that allowed them to identify the smaller firm would yield a surplus
equal to R¯
(
E
(
p∗L
R¯
)
− E
(
min(
p∗L
R¯
,
p∗S
R¯
)
))
– this could be as large as .2R¯, but is only .07R¯
when v
R¯
= .5. The incentive to search for those who know only of the smaller firm is no
more than .04R¯. Clearly, as in all search models, if the cost of search is large relative to
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its expected benefit there will be no search to upset the equilibrium. This is most likely
to be the case when v
R¯
is large.
4 Choosing Customer Bases with a General Advertising
Technology
The incentive to avoid overlap in customer bases drives the asymmetry of the equilibrium
we found in the previous section. The degree of overlap that results from a particular
level of advertising is in turn determined by the advertising technology. This raises an
obvious question: what can we say about the set of advertising technologies that generate
the asymmetry result? Perhaps surprisingly, we will show here that the asymmetry in
the customer base game is a very general result.
Let M(N1,N2) denote the overlap associated with an arbitrary advertising technol-
ogy. At the most general level, the only a priori restrictions on M(N1,N2) would seem
to be that overlap is non-negative (M(N1,N2) ≥ 0) and that overlap is non-decreasing
in the sizes of the customer bases (M1(N1,N2) ≥ 0, and M2(N1,N2) ≥ 0).
Consider the expected profit of firm 1 in the stage 2 price game. In the LT regime
(where N1 < N2), firm 1 is the smaller firm so its profit in the stage 2 mixed strategy
equilibrium is λ2R¯N1, and in the GT regime (where N1 > N2) it is the larger firm so so
its profit in the stage 2 mixed strategy equilibrium λ1N1R¯. Of course, λ1 = 1−
M(N1,N2)
N1
and λ2 = 1−
M(N1,N2)
N2
, so
pi∗1 =
 (1−
M(N1,N2)
N2
)N1R¯ if N1 < N2
(1− M(N1,N2)
N1
)N1R¯ if N1 > N2.
Then, differentiating with respect to N1, we get
∂Π∗1
∂N1
=
 R¯−
R¯M(N1,N2)
N2
− R¯N1M1(N1,N2)
N2
if N1 < N2
R¯− R¯N1M1(N1,N2)
N1
if N1 > N2.
When we evaluate these partial derivatives at the point N1 = N2 = N , we see that
∂Π∗
1
∂N1
for the LT regime is smaller than it is in the GT regime if and only if R¯M(N,N)
N
> 0. So,
if there is any overlap in customer bases, except in very special circumstances there will
be no symmetric equilibrium of the customer base game.
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To be more precise, let A1(N1) denote the firm 1’s advertising cost for a customer
base of size N1, and assume that A1(N1) is concave and differentiable. Then, if there
is any overlap in customer bases, there can be no equilibrium in the customer base
game where N1 = N2 = N > 0. Such an equilibrium would require that the following
conditions be satisfied:
R¯−
R¯M(N,N)
N
− R¯N
M1(N,N)
N
≥ A1(N)
R¯− R¯N
M1(N,N)
N
≤ A1(N).
But, if M(N,N) > 0, it is impossible to satisfy both.
Result 6. If the advertising technologies used by the firms generate positive overlap,
and if the cost of generating a customer base is concave and differentiable, there is no
symmetric equilibrium in the customer base game.
5 Conclusions
We have investigated a two-stage game where firms advertise to manage their customer
bases and then choose prices simultaneously to maximize profit. The analysis is limited
to a two-firm, homogeneous good setting. In the stage 2 pricing game, as long as one
firm has some customers that know only of it and not of its competitor, there is no
pure strategy equilibrium. When there is overlap between customer bases but the size
of the customer bases is asymmetric, both firms use randomized pricing strictly above
marginal cost even when all the customers of the smaller firm know of the larger firm.
As the overlap of the two firm’s customer bases increases from zero to the smaller firm’s
customer base, prices and profits decrease linearly for both firms. At the extremes, when
the customer bases have no overlap we have two monopolies charging monopoly prices
and when both the firm’s have identical customer bases we have marginal cost pricing
and zero profits.
In the stage 1 game we find that as long as the advertising technology generates any
overlap in customer bases there is no symmetric equilibrium. There are, however, two
asymmetric equilibria in which one firm always chooses a smaller customer base than
the other firm. The smaller firm has an incentive to limit its advertising in an effort to
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keep the overlap in the customer bases imperfect because the stage 2 price equilibrium
profits are negatively affected by the size of the overlap. Given a specific advertising
technology, we find that at the limit when the marginal cost of advertising is zero the
large firm targets the entire population and the small firm targets half the population
thereby limiting the overlap to half of the population. Both firms enjoy positive profits in
equilibrium. We find that the equilibrium is efficient in the special case where consumers
have unitary demand.
Finally, we are able to quantify and compare the incentive consumers have to search
for the special case where consumers have unitary demand. We find that, at the very
most, the consumers who have the most to gain from search benefit from search by an
amount equal to one quarter of their reservation price. However, because search increases
the overlap of the two firms customer bases thus reducing the firms’ market power and
equilibrium prices, the smaller firm has an incentive to find ways to discourage consumers
from searching. Importantly, firms will lose out on all units of the good that they sell
and so their incentive to frustrate search is many times greater than the incentives facing
consumers.
A Proof of the Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
Let Πi(pi|Fj) (i ∈ {S,L}, j 6= i) denote firm i’s expected profit, given price pi and the
other firm’s CDF, Fj , and let Π
∗
i denote the expected equilibrium profit of firm i. A
mixed strategy equilibrium is characterized by the following properties:
P1: if fi(pi) > 0, then Πi(pi|Fj) = Π
∗
i
P2: if fi(pi) = 0, then Πi(pi|Fj) ≤ Π
∗
i
P3: if Πi(pi|Fj) < Π
∗
i , then fi(pi) = 0.
In words: the prices that get positive probability in firm i’s equilibrium density function
all yield profit Π∗i ; all other prices yield an expected profit that is no larger than Π
∗
i ;
and all prices that yield an expected profit that is less than Π∗i get zero probability in
firm i’s equilibrium density function.
We first establish some useful results based on the assumption that a mixed strategy
equilibrium exits, and then go on to find one. Notice that for any FS , ΠL(p¯, FS) ≥
λLNLR¯, because when pL = p¯ the number of customers who patronize the larger firm
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is no smaller that λLNL and revenue per customer is R¯. This establishes a lower bound
for the larger firm’s profit in any mixed strategy equilibrium: Π∗L ≥ λLNLR¯.
Next we show that p is a lower bound on the support of the larger firm’s DF. If
pL < p, then for any FS , ΠL(pL|FS) < NLR(p) = λLNLR¯ ≤ Π
∗
L. The strict inequality
follows because the number of customers who patronize the larger firm is no larger than
NL and revenue per customer is less than R(p), the equality follows from the definition
of p, and the weak inequality was established in the previous paragraph. Property P3
then dictates that, in any mixed strategy equilibrium, fL(pL) = 0 for all pL < p.
To establish similar results for the smaller firm, assume that fL(pL) = 0 for all
pL < p, as must be the case in any mixed strategy equilibrium. Given this assumption,
if pS < p, then ΠS(pS|FL) = R(pS)NS , which is strictly increasing in pS . Notice that
the limit of R(pS)NS as the pS approaches p from below is R(p)NS = λLNSR¯, so
Π∗S ≥ λLNSR¯. Then, from Property P3 we see that in any mixed strategy equilibrium,
fS(pS) = 0 for all pS < p (since for any such price ΠS(pS |FL) < λLNSR¯).
This suggests that there is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which Π∗L = λLR¯NL,
Π∗S = λLR¯NS , and that the prices that get positive probability are in [p, p¯].
To prove that the price density functions in (1) - (3) constitute a mixed strategy
equilibrium, we must verify that properties P1, P2 and P3 set out above are satisfied
for both firms. We begin with the larger firm. If pL > pS , the larger firm’s profit is
R(pL)λLNL since the customers who know of both firms choose to buy from the smaller
firm. The probability that pL > pS is just FS(pL). On the other hand, if pL < pS , the
larger firm’s profit is R(pL)NL since the customers who know of both firms now choose
to buy from the larger firm, and the probability that pL < pS is just 1− FS(pL). Since
there are no mass points in fS(pS) in (1), we can ignore the case where pL = pS. Then,
the larger firm’s expected profit is just
ΠL(pL|FS) = R(pL)λLNLFS(pL) +R(pL)NL(1− FS(pL)) for all 0 ≤ pL ≤ p¯.
It is straightforward to verify the following:
ΠL(pL|FS) = λLR¯NL for all p ≤ pL ≤ p¯
ΠL(pL|FS) < λLR¯NS for all 0 ≤ pL < p.
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It is then clear that properties P1, P2 and P3 are satisfied for the larger firm.
Similarly, the smaller firm’s expected profit given pS and FL is
ΠS(pS|FL) =
 R(pS)λSNSFL(pS) +R(pS)NS(1− FL(pS)) for all 0 ≤ pS < p¯R(pS) (mL(p¯) (1+λS2 NS)+ (1−mL(p¯))NS) for pS = p¯.
It is straightforward to verify the following8:
ΠS(pS |FL) = λLR¯NS for all p ≤ pS < p¯
ΠS(pS |FL) < λLR¯NS for pS = p¯
ΠS(pS |FL) < λLR¯NS for all 0 ≤ pS < p.
It is then clear that properties P1, P2 and P3 are satisfied for the smaller firm. QED.
B Best response functions
In this appendix we want to explicitly derive the best response functions expressed in
Result 3. First we arbitrarily restrict firm i to one of the two regimes, and find for each
regime a restricted best response function, BRLTi (Nj) for the LT and BR
GT
i (Nj) for the
GT regime. Then we splice these restricted best response functions to get the actual or
unrestricted best response function, BRi(Nj).
In the LT regime,
∂Vi(Ni,Nj)
∂Ni
= R¯
(
1−
2Ni
H
)
−
vH
H −Ni
.
Notice that because R¯ > v, ∂Vi(Ni=0,Nj)
∂Ni
> 0, so firm i always chooses Ni > 0. Then,
given the concavity of the objective function within the LT regime, if ∂Vi(Ni=Nj ,Nj)
∂Ni
≥ 0
firm i’s maximizing choice is Ni = Nj , and if
∂Vi(Ni=Nj ,Nj)
∂Ni
< 0 firm i’s maximizing
choice is the Ni such that
∂Vi(Ni,Nj)
∂Ni
= 0. The best response function for the LT regime
is therefore
BRLTi (Nj) = Nj if Nj ≤ ∆1
= ∆1 if Nj > ∆1,
8The second condition holds with equality if NS = NL.
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where ∆1 is as given in (7). For future reference, the maximized objective function for
the interior solution (BRLTi (Nj) = ∆1) is
V LTi = ∆1R¯
(
1−
∆1
H
)
− vH[ln(H)− ln(H −∆1)]. (10)
In the GT regime,
∂Vi(Ni,Nj)
∂Ni
= R¯
(
1−
Nj
H
)
−
vH
H −Ni
.
Because v > 0, ∂Vi(Ni,Nj)
∂Ni
approaches negative infinity as Ni approaches H, so firm i al-
ways choosesNi < H. Given the concavity of the GT objective function, if
∂Vi(Ni=Nj ,Nj)
∂Ni
≤
0 firm i’s maximizing choice is Ni = Nj, and if
∂Vi(Ni=Nj ,Nj)
∂Ni
> 0 firm i’s maximizing
choice is the Ni such that
∂Vi(Ni,Nj)
∂Ni
= 0. It is useful to define a composite parameter,
∆2:
∆2 ≡ H
(
1−
√
v
R¯
)
∆2 is the smallest value ofNj such that
∂Vi(Ni=Nj ,Nj)
∂Ni
≤ 0, and Φ(Nj) satisfies
∂Vi(Ni=Φ(Nj),Nj)
∂Ni
=
0. The size of ∆2 relative to Φ(Nj) in (6) is easy to establish: when Nj < ∆2,
∆2 < φ(Nj), when Nj > ∆2, ∆2 > φ(Nj) and when Nj = ∆2, ∆2 = φ(Nj). The
best response function for the GT regime is
BRGTi (Nj) = Nj if Nj ≥ ∆2 (or if Nj ≥ φ(Nj))
= Φ(Nj) if Nj < ∆2 (or if Nj ≤ φ(Nj)).
A bit of algebra establishes the following useful inequalities:
0 < ∆1 < ∆2 < H.
For future reference, the maximized objective function for the interior solution (BRGTi (Nj) =
Φ(Nj)) is
V GTi (Nj) = Φ(Nj)R¯
(
1−
Nj
H
)
− vH[ln(H)− ln(H − Φ(Nj))]. (11)
Now let us splice the restricted best response functions to get the actual best response
function, BRi(Nj). When Nj < ∆1, Nj is so small that if forced to be in the LT
regime firm i would choose Ni = Nj . But it will not voluntarily choose the LT regime,
because the non-concavity in Vi(Ni,Nj) at Ni = Nj means that it gets an even larger
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profit by choosing Ni > Nj in the interior of the GT regime. Hence, when Nj < ∆1,
BRi(Nj) = Φ(Nj). This case is case a in Figure 1 where we have plotted Vi(Ni,Nj)
holding Nj fixed at a value less than ∆1. Notice that Vi(Ni,Nj) has a single local
maximum, in the interior of the GT regime, where Ni = Φ(Nj).
When Nj > ∆2, the story is similar. In this case, Nj is so large that if forced to be
in the GT regime firm i would choose Ni = Nj. But it will not voluntarily choose the
GT regime, because the non-concavity in Vi(Ni,Nj) at Ni = Nj means that it gets an
even larger profit by choosing Ni = ∆1 < Nj in the interior of the LT regime. Hence,
when Nj > ∆2, BRi(Nj) = ∆1. This case is case d in Figure 1– notice that in this case
there is a single local maximum in the interior of the LT regime.
The situation is a bit trickier when ∆1 ≤ Nj ≤ ∆2. In this case, illustrated in
cases b and c of Figure 1, Nj is large enough so that Vi(Ni,Nj) has a local maximum
in the interior of the LT regime (at Ni = ∆1), and small enough so that it has a local
maximum in the interior of the GT regime (at Ni = Φ(Nj)). So BRi(Nj) is either
∆1 in the LT regime, or Φ(Nj) in the GT regime, depending on which option yields
the larger payoff. As V LTi in (10) is independent of Nj, whereas V
GT
i (Nj) in (11) is a
continuous, decreasing function of Nj, and because V
GT
i (Nj) > V
LT
i when Nj = ∆1 and
V LTi > V
GT
i (Nj) when Nj = ∆2, we know that there must exists a value of Nj = N˜
such that V GTi (N˜) ≡ V
LT
i , implicitly defined in (8). There is no closed form solution
for N˜ . But to find the equilibria of the model it is sufficient to know that
∆1 < N˜ < ∆2
This completes the splice for firm i: if Nj ≤ N˜ , firm i’s best response is Φ(Nj) in the
GT regime, as in parts a and b of Figure 1, and if Nj ≥ N˜ , firm i’s best response is ∆1
in the LT regime, as in parts c and d of Figure 1. QED.
C Efficiency
Let us examine the special case in which the individual customer demands 1 unit of the
good for prices in interval [0, R¯] and 0 units for higher prices. Then, since demand is
perfectly inelastic with respect to price up to the reservation price R¯, the only efficiency
issue concerns the number of unique customers in the aggregate customer base. Call
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this number T (for total). The marginal cost of increasing the aggregate customer base
is just vT
H−T
, since the expected number of draws needed to uncover someone who is not
already in the base is H−T
T
. To maximize total surplus, T must be chosen so that this
marginal cost is equal to the reservation price, R¯, since R¯ is the surplus that is generated
when a new person enters the aggregate customer base. Solving this condition we get
the optimal size of the aggregate customer base, T ∗:
T ∗ = H
(
1−
v
R¯
)
.
Obviously, a monopolist would choose price R¯ for everyone in its customer base. So
to maximize its profit, a monopolist would choose its customer base Nm to equate the
marginal cost vNm
H−Nm
to R¯. The resulting customer base equals N∗m = T
∗ and therefore
the monopoly equilibrium is efficient. Given that the monopolist captures all of the
consumer surplus and incurs all the costs of making customers aware of its product, this
result is not surprising.
What about the duopoly equilibrium? When overlap in the customer bases is taken
into account, we see that the number of people in at least one customer base is
N∗S +N
∗
L −
N∗SN
∗
L
H
= HΩ+ 2ΩH −
2Ω2H2
H
= H
(
3Ω− 2Ω2
)
.
Then, a bit of algebra establishes, perhaps surprisingly, that the duopoly equilibrium is
also efficient:
H(3Ω − 2Ω2) = T ∗.
Result 7. Both the monopoly and duopoly equilibria are efficient, in the sense that total
surplus is maximized.
Of course, the monopolist captures all of the surplus as profit, whereas the duopolists
dissipate some of the surplus in the competition to capture it.
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